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ABSTRACT
The Europeanization of economic and financial governance poses a 
legitimacy question for the European Parliament (EP). Drawing from 
theories on resource-exchange and institutional legitimacy, we 
argue that committee hearings allow the EP to demonstrate its 
relevance as a political authority. We test our argument, focusing 
on the Committee on Economic & Monetary Affairs (ECON). 
Through an unprecedented systematic analysis of its hearings; we 
provide a fine-grained identification of all participants across two 
legislatures (2004-2014). We observe a considerable shift in the use 
of hearings from the 6th to the 7th legislature, reflected in the 
increase of events and participants. While business interests retain 
a strong presence, the participants’ composition changes substan-
tially. Research organizations and EU-level executive bodies saw the 
largest increase. Conversely, national level executive bodies saw a 
decrease in participation. Theoretically, we examine an understu-
died area of European governance, while contributing to discus-





Interest Groups; Governance; 
Legitimacy
1 Introduction
In recent years, the European Union (EU) has highlighted the role of procedures as 
an instrument protecting its democratic credentials against institutional capture, 
opaque policy-making, and public critique (Commission 2001; Schmidt 2013). The 
European Parliament (EP), being the EU’s only directly elected representative institu-
tion, has received scholarly attention. Indicatively, the literature has examined the 
tensions between transparency and informality within committees (Fasone and Lupo 
2015) as well as stakeholder mobilization (Lehmann, 2009; Coen, Lehmann, and 
Katsaitis 2021).
Nevertheless, little work examines committee hearings and their participants. Hearings 
are formal parliamentary procedures through which committees engage with various 
actors such as executive institutions, regulatory agencies, business interests, and civil 
society, to name but a few. By leaving them unexamined, we treat a formal procedure as 
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a black box, downplaying calls for further transparency over such procedures (Pedersen, 
Halpin, and Rasmussen 2015), undervaluing their role as accountability mechanisms (see 
Eriksen and Katsaitis 2020), and overlooking questions of expertise-bias in the EU’s 
governance (Bunea 2017; Rasmussen and Gross 2015). Overall, this limits the scope of 
the conceptual debate.
In this paper, we aim to assess the participants in the EP’s hearings by exploring an 
understudied aspect of European governance. We focus on the Committee on Economic 
& Monetary Affairs (ECON) a central committee that has seen an increase in its responsi-
bilities over time (Fasone 2014), in particular, following the Lisbon Treaty and later the Six- 
pack and Two-pack legislative reforms (Bressanelli and Chelotti 2016; Fromage 2018). Two 
interrelated questions come up: Which organizations participate in hearings? How has 
their composition changed over time?
Hearings are an instrument that serves different committee functions, and by implica-
tion leads to different actors’ participation. First, hearings are linked with the legislative 
process (Costa & Brack 2018). As (co-) legislators, parliaments must produce legislative 
outputs formally informed by representative policy stakeholders (Coen and Katsaitis 
2019a, 2019b). Second, parliaments act as the ultimate forum of political accountability 
scrutinizing the Commission, EU agencies, and the European Central Bank (Busuioc 2013). 
Third, the EP’s committees are increasingly using hearings as a way of empowering 
themselves vis-à-vis the Commission and the Council (Héritier et al. 2019). Finally, as 
ECON’s responsibilities over key policy areas became greater the use of hearings and 
participants over time is likely to have increased.
Addressing this research question is important in a number of ways. Research assessing 
the EP’s interaction with policy stakeholders has expanded over time, but committee 
hearings and their participants have evaded this focus. By examining hearings across 
time, we gain an important insight into the parliament’s evolution within economic 
governance, and the role of its hearings.
The paper maps and comparatively assesses the specific institutions, and organizations 
represented by speakers participating in the committee’s hearings across the 6th (2004–-
2009) and 7th (2009–2014) legislatures. The results indicate a considerable shift from the 
6th to the 7th legislature, reflected in a dramatic increase in the number of events and 
participants. While business interests retain a strong presence, the participants’ composi-
tion changes substantially. The participants representing research organization increases 
significantly, participants representing other political organizations decrease, and more 
executive authorities participate from one legislature to the next.
The paper provides an unprecedented systematic study of an entire population of 
hearings’ participants across two legislatures, creating an original dataset of 290 speakers 
across 66 events. Methodologically, it innovates through meticulous archival work, pro-
viding a fine-grained identification of the participants and linking them to specific hear-
ings. By doing so, the paper provides material for further research into the interplay 
between the EP and other actors (institutional, and interest group). Moreover, the paper 
contributes to our understanding of the EP and its role in the EU’s monetary, financial, and 
economic policy (see for example, Majone 2014; Mathieu 2016; Dawson, Enderlein, and 
Joerges 2015; Collignon and Diessner 2016; Chang and Hodson 2019); and it indirectly 
adds to broader discussions on deliberative democracy, governance and parliaments (see 
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for example, Fishkin and Mansbridge 2017; Crum and Fossum 2013; Chaqués-Bonafont 
and Muñoz Márquez 2016; Martin 2011).
We begin with a discussion on the role of hearings and ECON’s policy-making 
responsibilities, which acts as a guiding tool aiding this novel research venture. We 
then focus on the research design and analysis, and finally we present the discussion- 
conclusions.
2. Hearings: purpose & participants
To understand which organizations participate in ECON’s hearings and how this might 
have changed across time, we must first address the hearing’s purpose from an institu-
tional-organizational perspective; as well as ECON’s policy-making responsibilities. The EP 
has different forms of public events generally titled ‘hearings’ that act as forums allowing 
its committees to engage with various policy stakeholders through formal procedures. 
The EP’s Rules of Procedure stipulate on hearings that ‘[b]y special decision of a committee 
any other person may be invited to attend and to speak at a meeting’ (Rules of Procedure 
2017). Hearings are open to the public, recorded, often live-streamed online, and available 
on the EP’s online archive free of charge.
Organizing these events requires consensus, as well as exchanges between the com-
mittee’s political groups (primarily party whips), the secretariat, the relevant file’s rappor-
teur (and shadow-rapporteurs), the potential participants, and the EP’s research service; 
all of which constrain partisan effects on the individuals invited. Nevertheless, the parti-
cipants reflect also the purpose behind the hearing, which is intricately linked with the 
committee’s policy-making responsibilities.
The Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs is a central EP committee. ECON is 
one of the first EP committees to wield substantial policy-making power, due to the Single 
Market’s creation with the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 and the progressive integration of 
the above mentioned areas. It is also one of most populous committees in terms of the 
number of MEPs that are members. MEPs that act as committee chairs or vice-chairs in 
ECON tend to come from and/or continue to high-level positions within their domestic 
political arena or in the EU bubble. It is responsible for regulating financial services, it 
oversees policy on the free movement of capital and payments as well as policy on 
taxation and competition policies; it also has oversight of the European Central Bank 
and EU-level agencies in these fields.
In simpler terms, ECON is involved in three central policy fields, monetary policy, 
financial policy, and economic policy. However, not all tree policy fields are equally or 
similarly Europeanized and/or involve the EP. Therefore, its involvement in legislating and 
holding actors to account varies across them. In the last 20 years all three policy areas 
have become Europeanized especially following the 2008 crisis; ECON’s legislative respon-
sibilities have been more pronounced in financial policy.
In the area of financial policy ECON holds policy-making authority under the ordinary 
legislative procedure, as such it can influence legislation directly. Moreover, following 
2010 it is the political authority holding to account the newly created EU-level agencies 
linked to this field, specifically the European Securities & Markets Authority (ESMA), as well 
as the European Banking Authority (EBA), and the European Insurance and Occupational 
Pensions Authority (EIOPA). Monetary policy is the responsibility of the European Central 
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Bank that acts independently from political bodies. Nevertheless, ECON is responsible for 
holding the ECB to account, this includes questioning/interviewing future ECB presidents 
as well as annual exchanges considering the EU’s economy and monetary policy.
Over the last 10 years, the EP has managed to gain a greater role in economic 
governance under the Lisbon Treaty, and specifically through the Six-pack and Two- 
pack legislative reforms that introduced the component of ‘economic dialogues’. 
Economic dialogues ‘are held in order to enhance the dialogue between institutions on 
the application of economic governance rules and with Member States’ (EP 2019). While the 
EP does not hold legislative powers in this area it has the ability to influence discussions 
through dialogue, making hearings a central venue.
Overall, ECON holds legislative responsibilities, and acts as a check for executive institu-
tions. Hearings act a formal procedure that allow these central responsibilities to be 
facilitated via formal information exchange. From a legislative perspective, especially in 
the area of financial policy, they offer a formal space through which policy-makers and 
policy stakeholders can exchange opinions aiming to inform and formally legitimize policy 
outcomes; this includes interest groups as well as Institutions. Second, hearings are a tool 
for holding agencies that fall under ECON’s responsibility to account (primarily in the area 
of financial policy), as well as communicating with the ECB (monetary policy). Third, 
hearings offer a space for exchanges between the EP and the Council and the 
Commission explicitly on economic policy, where it holds less authority but remains 
a relevant actors.
Nevertheless, without systematic analyses of hearings and their participants we limit 
our understanding of the procedure, and the objectives it serves. Significantly, changes in 
the EU’s financial, monetary, and economic policy are likely to have altered their use and 
their participants. Below we outline how the use of hearings and their participants are 
likely to have changed over time.
2.1. Policy-making & interest groups
Due to information-asymmetries between the executives (supported by bureaucracies) 
and the parliaments’ limited research capacity, members of parliament rely on informa-
tion-expertise supplied by external actors (Austen-Smith 1993). Moreover, while produ-
cing legislation parliamentarians must also demonstrate that their legislative activities 
take into consideration pertinent actors’ position. Therefore, parliamentary committees 
invite relevant interest groups, and consult with them over their policy-making activity.
From a supply side perspective, economic and financial policy is one of the most 
populated policy fields in Brussels (JTR 2019). A substantial body of lobbyists compete to 
gain access into the EP’s policy-making process and influence economic governance, and 
these efforts include contacting MEPs and their offices, contacting the committees’ 
secretariats (see for example, Marshall 2015; Chalmers 2013), as well as participating in 
formal procedures, such as hearings. In this sense, while interest group participation in 
committee hearings does not automatically improve policy-making outcomes, it does 
offer MEPs relevant expertise from different stakeholder perspectives.
Considering the groups likely to be participating in hearings across the two legisla-
tures, we take into account the following. Given that economic sectors tend to feature 
high levels of business interest mobilization, we expect business interests to show 
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significant participation in committee hearings. However, the category of ‘business inter-
ests’ is broad, and so we set out some more granular assumptions regarding the different 
types of business interests present.
In the EU, the overarching framework governing financial regulation is Europeanised, 
but the actual implementation of the rules remains a national competence. Thus, in 
a multi-level regulatory environment that is territorially divided national level associations 
and businesses are better suited to provide cohesive expertise than EU level associations 
(Coen and Salter 2020; Chalmers 2018; Quaglia 2010). Indeed, the after-effects of the 
financial crisis exacerbated this reality, as trust between actors involved in financial 
governance deteriorated (Guiso 2010). On this basis, we expect that more business 
associations from the national level and fewer European-level associations participated 
during the 7th legislature. Moreover, dominant business actors, such as banks, are likely to 
have formed a greater portion of participants during the 7th legislature as the committee 
sought reliable and relevant actors to provide information.
Conversely, bearing in mind the distributive effects of the new banking union (Everson 
2015; Claeys, Hallerberg, and Tschekassin 2014), citizens and civil society groups have 
a clear incentive to participate in policy making over economic governance. Therefore, 
ECON may have opted to increase the number of organizations representing the public 
interest (e.g. civil society) participating in hearings, to address critiques of ‘policy without 
politics’ in Brussels (Schmidt 2006), and to improve public perceptions over its legislative 
outputs. Indicatively, MEPs supported the creation of an EU level NGO focused exclusively 
on financial regulation. We note that these efforts may follow the effect of interest groups’ 
media coverage vis-à-vis the financial sector (De Bruycker and Beyers 2015). Overall, we 
expect that over time the number of civil society participants in hearings increased.
Finally, we consider a less discussed group: research organizations. As policy-making 
becomes progressively more complex, parliaments invite experts, such as think tanks, 
universities, and research institutes to give advice over their legislative activity. These 
groups provide a double benefit: as high-level experts in a particular field, they address an 
objective informational demand (Radaelli 1999). Simultaneously, they allow representa-
tives to hold debates that are epistemic in nature minimizing political differences, making 
it easier for actors to pivot positions and reach agreement over legislative choices (Estlund 
2009). As such, we also expect an increase in the number of research organizations 
participating in committee hearings over time.
2.2. Co-legislating & institutions
Overall, ECON’s policy-making role in the central areas it is involved has increased over 
time, which in turn has increased its formal and informal interaction with EU institutions. 
Specifically, the European Commission and the Council. To maintain communication and 
improve policy-making flows, the Commission and the Council have permanent repre-
sentatives during committee hearings. In other words, the Council and the Commission 
can have (and almost always do) a representative during a hearing that follows the 
exchanges during it. Nevertheless, this does not automatically preclude participation, as 
these representatives are primarily observers. On the contrary, when a representative for 
the Commission or the Council is to formally participate in a hearing a representative is 
included in the hearing’s formal schedule.
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As such, it is likely that over time the presence of the Commission and the Council is 
likely to have increased in hearings as participants. Legislative responsibility in financial 
regulation means that ECON is likelier to hold hearings in order to formalize the exchange 
of opinion and policy-making outcomes. In doing so, the committee manages to expose 
differences between the Commission and the Council and to strengthen its position 
(Héritier et al. 2019).
While scholars argue that the EP’s ability to impact policy outcomes in economic 
governance is limited (Bressanelli and Chelotti 2016, 2018), the current structure of 
economic governance places the EP at the centre of EU level inter-institutional discus-
sions. Thus, changes in the EU’s system of economic governance have shifted authority 
from the broader national level, placing it in the hand of national governments and 
intergovernmental bargaining in Brussels (Fasone 2014; Fabbrini and Puetter 2016; Auel 
and Hoing 2014). We note that, six-pack and two-pack negotiations have made hearings 
the main way through which these actors engage in dialogue. As such, it is likely that over 
time interactions through hearings is likely to have increased.
2.3. Hearings & accountability forum
Decreasing barriers to trade and economic integration have supported the creation of 
specialized depoliticized bodies, or non-majoritarian regulators on a global scale (Coen 
and Thatcher 2005). The EU is no exception with its ‘agencificiation’ discussed exten-
sively within the literature (Levi-Faur 2011). In this environment, a substantial part of 
policy-making and policy implementation is conducted by organizations that are not 
directly accountable to the public, and instead parliaments act as a final check, holding 
these organizations politically accountable (Bovens 2007). In the EU, the EP performs 
this activity by requesting annual performance reports, written questions addressed to 
agencies, and significantly, by inviting their representatives to inquiries into their 
activities.
Changes in economic and financial governance included the creation of the European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), and 
the procedure of the European Semester (ES) (among others) (Quaglia 2013; Amtenbrink 
and Markakis 2019). They are responsible for financial regulation, monetary policy, and 
fiscal planning – all of which fall under ECON’s responsibility.
The EP is an important political player with a role in holding these agencies politically 
accountable on behalf of the electorate – ensuring that the ‘means’ of policy are decided 
by the agencies but that the ‘policy ends’ are decided by political authorities (Christiano 
2012).1 The committee has a clear incentive and responsibility to invite them to its 
hearings, and thereby maintaining its relevance as an accountability forum.
From the perspective of the agencies, accountability is about managing expectations 
(Busuioc and Lodge 2016), and so they have an incentive to participate in hearings as 
a way of bolstering their reputation by building relationships of trust with their political 
principal. As such, it is likelier that over time administrative authorities, especially from the 
EU level, participate in ECON’s hearings.
Finally, we note that the committee may also seek to highlight its relevance to national 
electorates by side-lining political organizations from the national level. By doing so, the 
committee implicitly turns them into outsiders, diminishing their role in representing 
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voters at ground level. In simpler terms, along with the shift of policy power from national 
to the EU level, the EP may attempt to entrench its position within this system (Majone 
2014; Olsen 2018) by inviting fewer national political authorities.
Therefore, ECON has gained significant policy-making authority whether as co- 
legislator, participant, or as a check on agencies and the ECB. We expect changes in the 
number of events and participants over time. First, the number of hearings and partici-
pants will increase. Second, the participants will change: in terms of interest groups, 
hearings will involve more: (i) companies (e.g. banks); (ii) research organizations (e.g. think 
tanks, universities); (iii) civil society bodies. In terms of institutional actors, more EU level 
executive organizations will participate: (i) the Commission; (ii) agencies; (iii) the ECB; and 
fewer national level political organizations: (i) ministries; (ii) government representatives; 
(iii) parliaments.
Nevertheless, it is possible that hearings remain an exceptional tool that pressed for 
time MEPs are reluctant to employ. This paper is interested in exploring committee 
hearings by assessing the typology of participants across time. In the following section, 
we discuss the research design.
3. Research design
To map and assess ECON’s hearings across legislatures, we require information on the 
hearings held by the committee and the participants that attended them. Information on 
the processes and various events held by committees from 2001 onwards are available to 
the public through the EP’s online archive.
This information is available in the form of scanned schedules/programmes of events 
turned into pdf or original pdf files. These files are in an unstandardized format making 
automated text analysis an unreliable data collection method. Moreover, to the best of 
our knowledge this is one of the first studies assessing the EP’s committee hearings and 
their participants, across time. Because this study has exploratory characteristics, we 
chose to collect data through a directed content analysis of the hearings’ schedules, 
focusing on the organizations participating and their classification (Hsieh and Shannon 
2005; Krippendorf 2004). Since we are interested in assessing the EP’s use of hearings over 
time, we examine hearings across two legislatures the 6th (2004–2009) and the 7th 
(2009–2014). We focus on ECON as a committee that is central to the EP, and has received 
increasing responsibilities over time.
Furthermore, we note that committees employ different forms of hearings that serve 
similar purposes; for example, committees employ ‘exchange of views’ with representa-
tives of specific organizations. To ensure the study’s external validity and reliability we 
decided to conduct meticulous archival work over the entire population of committee 
events. Below, we explain the data collection process in detail. On a smaller note, the 
complex and time-consuming process required to collect this information underscores 
key concerns on the difference between availability and accessibility to information on EU 
governance, and speaks to broader concerns with respect to the EU’s transparency and 
accountability (Héritier 2003).
For the data collection, we gathered all the programmes and schedules available for 
hearings held by the committee for the entire 6th and 7th legislatures, covering the period 
between September 2004 and July 2014. Because different types of events can be classified 
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only after having read their schedule, we downloaded all the available documents. We 
proceeded by going through all the collected schedules and organising events based on 
their self-classification into three categories: (i) exchange of views; (ii) hearing; (iii) inter- 
parliamentary meetings. We outline the difference between types of events below.
Exchanges of views are events where the EP invites a specific institution such as the 
European Central Bank, while hearings involve broader panels of speakers that are often 
recorded on video and made available online. They are events that tend to be open to 
a broader audience outside of the committee, and the subjects addressed in their context 
are likelier to interest a wide-ranging crowd including citizens. Additionally, the panel will 
include a diverse set of speakers that comprises of interest groups, organizations, agen-
cies, and others. Inter-parliamentary hearings are events where national parliamentary 
representatives interact with EP representatives.
We then proceeded to collect information on the speakers representing organizations, 
agencies and interest groups per hearing: their name, the organisation they represented, 
the title of the event, and its date; excluding speakers representing the EP. This process 
created an original dataset with the entire population of events (66) held by the commit-
tee, and speakers (290). Following that, we placed the organizations represented by 
participants into four categories: (a) interest groups; (b) national level authority; (c) EU 
level authority; (d) international authority. Following the theoretical discussion and our 
aim for a nuanced analysis of the participants, each category includes sub-categories, 
which we set out in detail below.
(A) The interest group category includes organizations that are not state authorities or 
agencies, and has six sub-categories: (i) business organizations, such as banks, and 
companies (e.g. Deutsche Bank); (ii) research organizations, such as universities 
and think tanks (University of Oxford, Centre for European Policy Studies); (iii) civil 
society, such as NGOs (e.g. Finance Watch); (iv) European level associations, such as 
trade and professional associations at the EU level (e.g. Business Europe); (v) 
national associations, such as trade and professional associations (e.g. German 
workers’ trade union); (vi) consultancies and legal firms (e.g. Roland Berger).
(B) The national level authorities category includes four sub-categories: (i) national 
agency (e.g. German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority); (ii) national bank 
(e.g. Bank of France, Bank of Italy); (iii) parliament, which includes representative 
forums (e.g. French National Assembly, Polish Senate); (iv) ministry (e.g. Polish 
Ministry of Finance).
(C) The EU level authorities category includes five sub-categories framing EU institu-
tions and other bodies: (i) the European Commission (e.g. Directorate General on 
Competition); (ii) the European Central Bank; (iii) European Supervisory Authorities/ 
Supervisory Committees (e.g. Committee of European Securities Regulators, 
European Securities & Markets Authority); (iv) Council (e.g. Ecofin; Eurogroup); (v) 
High Level Expert Group.
(D) The international level authorities (International Monetary Fund, World Bank) is 
a limited category representing less than 5% of speakers, and so we do not address 
it in our analysis. However, following broader discussions on the internationaliza-
tion of economic and financial governance, international level authorities partici-
pated primarily in the 7th legislature.
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Based on the data collected we conducted an analysis on the hearing’s participants, 
comparing the speakers representing different categories.
We assessed the percentage a category of participants represented relative to the total 
population of participants per legislature, and relative to their category, for each legis-
lature. Because we were particularly interested in the change observed across legislatures, 
we also assessed the absolute change of participants per category across legislatures (6th 
to 7th), and compared it relative to the change of the total population of participants, and 
relative to their category change (see figures below, and tables in annex for details). The 
data and analysis provide the first mapping of committee hearings across time and 
a unique perspective into the EP’s role in the EU’s economic governance. To provide an 
overview we also provide the evolutions of participants per annum (see Figure 1).
4. Analysis
We begin by assessing the aggregate image, examining the evolution of the hearings and 
their participants across time. The results show that hearings have become an important 
instrument in the committee’s toolkit marking a substantial difference from their limited 
use in the late ‘90s and early 2000s (Bouwen 2004). The number of events and the number 
of participants increased from the 6th to the 7th legislature, painting an image of 
a committee engaging in a greater number of discussions (see Table 1). Focusing on 
the type of event, we note that while the use of hearings doubled all other events 
decreased, indicating a change in the committee’s preferences in favour of broader 
Figure 1. Showing the absolute number of hearings’ participants, per type per year.
Table 1. Committee’s total number of events & speakers per legislature.
6th legislature 7th legislature Change
Exchange of Views 5 4 −1
Hearing 16 36 +20
Inter-parliamentary Meeting 4 1 −3
Total Events 25 41 +16
Speakers 101 189 +88
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discussion panels that are open to the public. Moreover, we highlight that the peek in the 
number of participants came in 2010, with most participants invited between 2009–2011, 
at the highlight of the financial crisis and the EU’s response to it. Conversely, while the 
number of inter-parliamentary hearings was limited during the 6th legislature, it 
decreased further during the 7th.
Research organizations and European Authorities in bold outline.
As such, from the outset of the analysis we observe that the committee has picked up 
on the use of hearings, amplifying its engagement with policy stakeholders and policy- 
makers. To gain a better insight on the hearing’s use we assess in detail the organizations 
represented across the two legislatures. We begin by assessing changes in participants 
from the interest group population. In agreement with research noting their intense 
mobilization across the EP’s committees (Coen & Katsaitis 2019b), interest groups are 
the primary organizations represented in hearings, accounting for slightly more than half 
of the overall speaker population across legislatures (see Figures 1, 2 and Table 1 in 
annex). Institutional actors and agencies cover the remaining population of participants.
Focusing on the interest group population, we make two notable observations. In 
contrast to our expectation that national associations would have a more prominent role 
than European associations during the hearings of the 7th legislature, business has been 
and remains the key protagonist. Conceptually, this goes against the assumption that 
European and national level associations have insider access in the EP across the board 
due to their information and expertise, and their organizational capacity (Bouwen 2004). 
That is to say, though we appreciate associations as parliamentary insiders their access is 
not equal across the board.
We underscore the importance of the nature of the policy field, which promotes single 
company action over collective action. Thus, companies’ preferential treatment is due to 
their limited incentive to co-operate under broader EU level associations in the field of 
financial policy. We point out that this dataset does not test informal activity; thus, bank 
associations may be better at engaging with the MEPs informally, but the nature of 
hearings requires participants that can represent with certainty the financial industry. 
Figure 2. Hearings’ participants representing interest groups, as a percentage of the total participants 
per legislature.
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For example, the MEPs want to discuss market regulation with BNP Paribas, rather than 
French or European bank associations.
Significantly, the results lend support to the EP’s swelling demand for epistemic 
expertise, in the context of economic governance (Quack 2010; Dunlop and Radaelli 
2016). As policy making has become more complex, MEPs have developed genuine 
expertise demands linked to the policy area they oversee (Coen and Katsaitis 2015). 
Participants representing research organizations, such as universities and think tanks, 
nearly doubled across legislatures becoming the second most prominent interest group 
participant next to business participants. These groups provide targeted expertise that is 
often linked to the committee’s commissioned studies.
In sharp contrast, the results do not support the expectation that ECON’s hearings 
serve a public deliberative purpose. The committee does not attempt to engage in policy 
making with the people by giving access to public interest groups into formal debates. 
Following from discussions on the institutional maturity of the EP and its embedding 
within the core of the EU’s policy-making system (Westlake 2018), ECON demonstrates its 
role as monopoly of political representation by setting up a debate involving market 
actors and other institutional players directly, while excluding other public representa-
tives (Schmidt 2014). This becomes clearer when also considering the institutional 
participants.
From a conceptual perspective, these results highlight the complex informational 
demands the field generates. At the same time, it points to the variety of access points 
open to different interest groups: specific types of interest groups can have prominent 
access into one type of policy-making procedure, policy field, or policy stage. However, it 
is less likely that they will enjoy equal access at every step and across the board (Coen, 
Lehmann, Katsaitis 2021). The role research organizations play in hearings contrasts with 
their mobilization intensity at the aggregate level. The EP holds a set of access badges that 
it distributes to different interest groups as its informational needs vary.
While interest groups represent approximately 52% (EP6) and 58% (EP7) of the total 
participants at the hearings (see Figure 1, and Table 1 in annex for details), the remaining 
Figure 3. Hearings’ participants representing different EU level institutions and authorities, as 
a percentage of the total participants per legislature.
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population – a considerable 48% (EP6) and 42% (EP7) – are institutional actors. Focusing 
on EU level institutional actors, we note their increased participation across the board, 
high level expert groups being the only exception (see Figure 3, and Table 2 in annex). In 
line with discussions on the ‘unexpected’ winners of new economic governance (Bauer 
and Becker 2014) the Commission saw its formal participation more than double across 
legislatures, as it engages with a co-legislator. We note however, that in contrast the 
Council saw a relatively small increase of its participation.
Similarly, integration in financial regulation led to the creation of agencies, who have 
also seen their participation double as they were invited either to provide their expertise 
in relation to specific legislative files, such as MIFID; or as the committee acted on its 
responsibility to hold the agencies’ politically accountable. A substantive concern has 
been the committee’s ability to respond to its evolving responsibility in time. That is to 
say, are the EP’s and its committee’s institutional reflexes up to speed? The results indicate 
that ECON has reacted in real time to address democratic concerns associated with 
executive accountability. We underscore that the actual impact or need to impact 
agencies decisions is a different normative debate.
Significantly, this image contrasts national level institutional participants, and provides 
a better overview of the committee’s authority. Assessing national level institutions and 
authorities we observe a change in attitude towards the opposite direction (see Figure 4, 
and Table 3 in annex). The only institutional actor to observe a minor increase in their 
participation, relative to the population, were national level agencies. We discuss the 
conceptual and research implications below.
5. Discussion and conclusions
In this paper, we aimed to explore the EP’s hearings and their participants as an under-
studied area of European governance. We asked: which organizations participate in 
hearings? How has their composition changed across time? We focused on the 
Committee on Economic & Monetary Affairs (ECON), a central committee that has seen 
Figure 4. Hearings’ participants representing National level institutions and authorities, as 
a percentage of the total participants per legislature.
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a significant increase in its responsibilities over time. Hearings are diverse tool that allows 
the committee to complete different functions such as: legislating, holding agencies to 
account, and policy-making. Following meticulous archival work, we mapped the entire 
population of hearings and the participants in the 6th and 7th legislature (2004–2014); 
creating a unique map of the EP’s interaction with institutions, agencies, and interest 
groups across time.
The analyses show that hearings’ participants changed, quantitatively and qualita-
tively, over time. Highlighting the role hearings have come to play, the number of 
hearings and participants saw a dramatic increase. We note that in the period analysed 
(2004–2014), ECON’s hearings appear to react to the 2008–2009 financial crisis, and the 
policy and institutional changes that came with it The results demonstrate that the 
majority of participants across legislatures represent interest groups; underscoring the 
well-documented role interest groups have in Brussels and highlighting business’ insider 
status. Business that mobilizes strongly across the field, also gains significant access within 
the committee. Nevertheless, national financial organizations gain greater access over 
European and national associations. Conversely, the limited participation of civil society 
and NGOs highlights what is often dubbed as a ‘bias’ in interest groups preferences, 
specifically in economic sectors.
Significantly, research groups and EU level executive bodies are the organizations that 
saw the most intense increase in participation from the 6th to the 7th legislature. 
Specifically in the 7th legislature, research organizations share nearly the same number 
of participants as business. The committee may demand expertise that allows the MEPs to 
discuss common legislative goals in a complex field (Estlund 2009); as well as face 
information asymmetries vis-à-vis the agencies they hold to account. Interestingly these 
results reveal a type of interest group that has been less assessed by the literature, and 
provides a potential future space for research.
The committee has signalled it has institutional reflexes, with executive EU level 
institutions being central participants during the 7th legislature, observing an increase 
in participation nearly across the board. Acting as an accountability forum the committee 
has actively engaged with relevant executive institutions. In turn, the EU’s agencies have 
attempted to manage their reputation by engaging with the EP as a political authority 
(Busuioc and Lodge 2016). Notably both agencies and committee have met as they 
attempt to attune their (mutual) responsibilities (Eriksen & Katsaitis 2020).
The committee’s reaction demonstrates how the Europeanization of a policy field 
creates an opportunity structure where political order, including procedures, follow. 
However, it remains for future research to assess if hearings act as tool that allows the 
committee to demonstrate and generate political legitimacy. In this context, we would 
like to highlight that the monopoly of political representation within procedures lays with 
elected representatives, and from at least some normative perspectives risks the overall 
performance (Lord 2018).
This paper is a unique study of the participants at EP committee hearings across 
legislatures. It contributes to discussions on committee hearings as formal procedures, 
and specifically their role in the EU’s system of governance. Taking into consideration the 
evolution of the policy field, the EP responded in time to political demands associated with 
the fast pace of economic governance. Further research combining the literature within 
democratic theory with empirical work on procedural legitimacy offers a potentially fruitful 
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 13
and timely future research direction in governance studies. From a methodological per-
spective, content and/or text analysis would provide a better insight of actors’ motivations, 
arguments, and positions in the deliberative sphere. In the context of EU governance, this 
would well complement the rich body of work that has taken legal analytic perspectives.
Note
1. All three EU level agencies formed following the financial crisis are politically accountable to 
the EP. The European Securities and Markets Authority is one of the few EU level agencies 
with implementation powers (Moloney 2011) that notes that it is politically accountable to 
ECON on its website.
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